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Net displacement  of toxic  intensity  toward  developing  countries
may  not have  been  inevitable  in the last two  decades. And  toxic
industrial  migration  seems  to have been  the result of restrictive
trade  policies  in the developing  countries  themselves  more  than
of regulatory  cost differences  between  the North and the South.
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Several  previous studies  have  asked whether  * This happens  because  manufacturing  has a
environmental  controls  imposed  in the industrial  declining  share  of GDP at higher  income  levels,
economies  are diverting  investments  in pollu-  not because  of any shift toward  a cleaner  mix of
Jon-intensive  activities  off-shore.  Broadly,  these  manufacturing  activities.
studies  conclude  that direct investment  does not
appear  to be stimulated  by such regulations,  * The more rapidly  growing  high-income
partly because  the cost of emission  controls  is  countries  have actually  enjoyed  negative  growth
generally  a tiny fraction  of operating  costs.  in toxic intensity  of their manufacturing  mix.
Yet direct investment  reflects  only part of  o  Stricter  regulation  of pollution-intensive
what may be happening  to world  production  production  in the OECD  countries  appears  to
patterns. Technology  transfers  may  occur with  have led to significant  locational  displacement,
no simultaneous  direct investment,  and produc-  with consequent  acceleration  of industrial
tion may readily shift toward a different  global  poUudon  intensity  in developing  countries. The
distribution  without  either direct  investment  or  poorest economies  seem  to have the highest
technology  transfer.  growth in toxic intensity.  One cannot,  of course,
be certain  of the  causal connection.
Lucas,  Wheeler,  and Hettige  attempt  a
general  test of the displacement  hypothesis,  * Polution intensity  has grown  most rapidly
developing  time series estimates  of manufactur-  in developing  economies  that are relatively
ing pollution  intensity  for a large sample  of  closed  to world  market forces.  Relatively  closed,
developed  and developing  countries  between  fast-growing  economies  experienced  rapid
1960  and 1988. Among  their conclusions:  structural  transitions  toward greater  toxic inten-
sity. The opposite  seems to have been true for
- As a result  of shifts in industrial  composi-  more  open economies.
tion, total manufacturing  emissions  relative  to
GDP grow faster  than GDP at lower levels  of per
capita income  and slower  than  GDP at higher
levels of income.
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This  paper  is  largely empirical. It  examines how  the  structure of  manufactulring
production varies, both across colintries  and through  time, in relation to the toxic emissions  of
component  industries. Evidence  is also  presented  on the connection  between  these variations  and
trade policy liberalization.'
Industrial  emissions may be thought  of as output multiplied  by the pollution  intensity  of
that output. In turn the pollution  intensity  of output derives  from the mix of industrial  products,
the processes used to produce  each of these goods, and the treatment of the resultant  waste from
these processes.  It is important  to establish  at the outset that the present  investigation  addresses
only the first of these elements -- the effect of product (or industrial) mix.  This scope of
analysis is dictated by the nature of the data available, which are described in section  II.  Yet
this evidence does offer some  interesting  insights, for little systematic  evidence  currently exists
in this sphere. 2
Meanwhile  section  I discusses, in broad terms, some of the elements likely to affect the
pollution intensity of industrial  production,  before turning to the results in section  III.
I. Sources of Change in Pollution  Intensity
1. Development  and Private Comparative  Advantage
In the absence of binding controls on the generation  of environmental  bads - including
failure of private contractual arrangements to contain damaging effects - there will be over-
production and over-consumption  of environmentally  harmful  commodities. Free trade in such
an unregulated context results in a  distribution of production across countries founded on
comparative private cost advantages without regard to environmental costs: the capacity or
willingness of nations to withstand or accept environmental  damage does not enter the trade
calculus.
As nations  develop, the range of commodities  in which they have a private comparative
cost advantage in trade obviously shifts.  These shifts may arise from accumulating  capital
available  per worker, from improvements  in the state of know-how  and worker skills, or from
enhanced ability to exploit natural resources.  Even if there were no environmental  regulation
in wealthier  economies, free trade under these conditions  might well lead to disproportionately
rapid growth of industrial pollution in developing  countries.  Rising manufacturing  emission
1. See, in add-";on, the earlier study bv Lucas, 'Toxic Releases by Manufacturing: World
Patterns and Policies," also prepared  as a Background  Paper for the World Development  Report
1992 and available in the Policy Research Working Paper Series.  This includes various toxic
emissions data and regressions  that are not included  in the present study.
2. See, however, Grossman  and Krueger (1991).
1intensity  with  income  might  simply  reflect  a  shift  toward  comparative advantage in
manufacturing generally, and of more capital intensive (smokestack) industries, which also
happen to be particularly  pollution intensive.
2. Environmental  Regulation
The standards required by envii.nmental regulations  vary substantially  across countries
for several reasons:
(a)  World  income inequality: The  desire  for  a  cleaner  environment is
presumably  a normal good, in the sense that demands for tighter standards rise
with income. The lower income  countries  would then  be less concerned  to avoid
local environmental  damage, as were the advanced nations at an earlier stage in
their growth.
(b) Environmental  absorptive capacity: Being able to locate industries with
emissions harmful to humans far from densely populated  areas presumably  has
its attractions.  On the other hand, some sparsely populated regions exhibit
particularly fragile eco-systems, diminishing their capacity to withstand toxic
releases.
(c) Regulatory  capability: Differences  in the ability to enforce regulations  may
explain some of the observable  gaps in legislated norms and in the strictness  of
enforcement.
In principle, regulating environmental damage and taxing emissions can be used to
internalize the external costs stemming  from various forms of pollution. To be effective, such
instruments  must alter the costs of production and hence comparative  cost advantages  in trade.
If the externalities  inherent  in environmental  damage  are appropriately  contained,  then trade will
take place according to the social comparative  advantage  of nations, an advantage  defined by a
balance  of environmental  and other costs.  But since both private costs and environmental  costs
differ from country to country, one would not expect to see an even spatial  distribution  of toxic
emissions in an optimally regulated  world.  Indeed, rising incomes may well cause worsening
emission levels, as cost advantage  shifts toward pollution intensive  industries. This trend may
then be overtaken at higher income levels by electoral demands for a cleaner environment  and
perhaps enhanced  capacity for enforcement.
3. Economic  Policy Regime
Industrial development  has traditionally  been viewed as damaging to the environment.
Since environmentalists  have joined most economists  in associating  liberal economic regimes
with more rapid industrial  growth, they  have tended to look askance  at openness. However, this
view neglects the possibility that more open economies  might follow a less pollution-intensive
industrial  development  path.  If openness  were to decrease  pollution intensity, then its negative
2environmental  impact via aggregate growth would certainly be mitigated, and might even be
reversed.
The labor cost advantage  of developing  economies,  if allowed free rein in the market,
would enhance the prospects of many 1: ht assembly activities with modest environmental
impacts.  Protection, on the other hand, is often focused  on relatively capital- and pollution-
intensive sectors such as chemicals  and steel.
4. Towards Testable Hypotheses
The previous discussion  identifies  three forces which may have significantly  affected the
worldwide  incidence  of industrial  pollution:  development-related  changes  in private comparative
advantage; environmental  regulation in the wealthier  economies; and differences in economic
policy regimes.  From this we distill three lines of analysis for further examination.
(i) Development  and sectoral composition:  The patterns of pollution intensity
of manufacturing  production in relation to level of economic development,  as
measured by income per capita, are explored.  In particular, it is frequently
asserted that pollution exhibits an inverse U-shaped  relationship  with per capita
income: in other words, pollution  is believed  to first rise faster than output at low
levels of income, then to rise more slowly than output after some critical income
threshold. 3
(ii)  OECD enviromnental  regulation  and displacement:  Since it is difficult to
proxy for the strictures  and implementation  of OECD  environmental  regulations,
direct tests of  any resultant production relocation are difficult to undertake.
Nonetheless, at a minimum, broad differences in trends across differing time
periods may be examined to ascertain whether production relocation of dirtier
industries  has been more rapid during episodes  of enhanced  OECD  environmental
regulation.
(iii) LDC economic  policy and pollution  intensity:  Has actual import  protection
among the developing  countries promoted or discouraged  production of dirtier
industrial  products?  This is examined  here by posing  the question:  Have periods
of trade liberalization led to more or less rapid growth in pollution intensive
industries  among LDCs?
3.  Although there are many assertions that such a pattern prevails there is little systematic
evidence either to support or refute this presumption. See, however, Grossman and Krueger
(1991)  who indeed find such an inverse-U  pattern in a cross country  study of urban air pollution.
3II. Data: Sources and issues
1. Data  Sources
For the purposes oi this study, four primary data sources are drawn upon to derive a
measure  of manufacturing  output's pollution  intensity  in some  80 countries  over the period 1960
to 1988.4
The first data source is a sample of 15,000 plants, drawn from the US Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA's) Toxic Release Inventory (fRI)  for 1987.  First mandated by
amendments  to U.S Superfund  legislation  in 1986, the TRI records air, water, underground  and
so!id waste releases of 320 toxic substances  by each reporting plant.
For the second  data source, the US Census  Bureau  has provided output data, drawn from
the 1987  Census of Manufactures,  for each of the 15,000 EPA sample plants.  After matching
plant-level  observations  and translating  from U.S. five digit SIC identifiers  to ISIC codes, the
aggregate  toxic releases  per unit of output are calculated  for each of 37 ISIC industry  categories.
The third data source provides information  about the toxic risk of different pollutants;
three toxic intensity  measures  per unit of output are considered. The first is simply  total pounds
released of all 320 toxic substances  -- whether atmospheric, effluent or solid -- per dollar's
worth of output.  In Table 1, this measure is labeled Total Release Intensity.  However, this
measure neglects the fact that some emissions are of greater concern than others.  We have
therefore developed alternative risk measures using the EPA's Human Health and Ecotoxity
Database (HHED), which contains several measures  of toxicological  and carcinogenic  potency
for each substance.
One of these is an ordinal measure of human toxicity risk, ranging from category 1
(mild) through 4 (very serious). Our second measure of toxic intensity uses these risk factors
in a linear weighted  sum of toxic releases  per dollar's worth of output. The implicit  assumption
is that the HHED risk scale is inherently  linear, with one pound of emission with risk factor 4
as damaging as four pounds of releases with risk factor 1.  This may not be a reasonable
approximation;  in consequence,  we have also constructed  a third weighted  index, which  assumes
that the HHED risk factors are exponential  (1, 10, 100, 1000), instead of linear.  In Table 1,
the latter two measures  are labeled  Linear and Exponential  Intensities. One feature of the three
intensity  measures in  Table  1  is  particularly significant for  our  analysis:  their  simple
(unweighted)  correlation is very high across the 37 ISIC categories  (See Table 2).  Little is lost,
therefore, by focusing  on one index, and we have chosen to work with the total (unweighted)
toxic intensity.
4. For full technical details, see Martin, Wheeler, Hettige, Stengren (1991).
4Tab-leI Toxic Release Intensities by Manufacturing Industries.
Industry  ISIC  TOTAL  RISK-FACTOR
Code  lbs.  per  WEIGHTED
Million  1987  Linear  Exponential
US  Dollars
Food  Products  3110  781.6  1418.0 20776.7
Beverages  3130  205.1  387.1  4647.5
Tobacco  3140  489.0  977.9  5308.9
Other  Textile  Production 3210  3502.2  6289.7 51086.7
Spinning,  Weaving  3211  3106.7  7400.0  154381.3
Wearing  Apparel  3220  1744.8  3341.8  17515.8
Leather  &  Products  3230  15380.7  25762.0  268922.3
Footwear  3240  2277.7  3324.0  11695.0
Wood  Products  3310  4399.4  9247.0  137294.6
Furniture,  Fixtures  3320  5366.8  10056.8 61291.0
Other  Paper  Prods.  3410  8741.7  16897.6 98109.5
Pulp,  Paper  3411  6225.9  11720.6  116899.8
Printing,  Publishing  3420  7513.9  14931.6  109252.0
Other  Industrial  Chem.  3510  52260.3  105302.7  966600.0
Basic  Ind.  Chem.  3511  32254.6  54922.9  609770.9
Synthetic  Resins  3513  14002.9  26436.7  544602.8
Other  Chemical  Prods.  3520  3563.8  6582.8 58049.0
Drugs  and  Medicines  3522  3966.7  7416.5 42819.7
Petroleun  Refineries  3530  3757.9  7669.5 78634.6
Petroleun  &  Coal  Prods.  3540  2544.1  4777.4 29444.3
Rubber  Products  3550  2934.2  5385.5 26305.2
Plastic  Products  n.e.c.  3560  9335.0  17310.5  175559.9
Pottery,  China,  etc.  3610  3614.5  5479.4 29164.7
Glass  &  Products  3620  1481.2  2893.2 43583.8
Non-Metal  Prods.  n.e.c.  3690  3853.8  5920.2 44194.1
Iron  and  Steel  3710  7642.8  12931.9  349897.7
Non-Ferrous  Metals  3720  9334.3  13234.7  151219.2
Metal  Products  3810  4592.5  9103.6  166930.2
Other  Machinery  n.e.c.  3820  1596.2  2840.5 39165.8
Office  &  Computing  Mach.  3825  303.3  452.4  3163.4
Other  Electrical  Mach.  3830  1797.3  3195.2 38967.4
Radio,  Television,  etc.  3832  1808.3  3137.4 29207.4
Transport  Equipment  3840  1007.8  2085.8 280'5.7
Shipbuilding,  Repair  3841  2546.5  3743.2  17426.9
Motor  Vehicles  3843  666.9  1188.4 15733.1
Professional  goods  3850  887.6  1576.5 16127.0
other  Industries  3900  2706.8  4679.0 42682.7
Table 2  Correlation  Coefficients:  Industry  Toxic Intensity
Linear Weights  Exponential  Weights
Total  0.995  0.944
Linear Weights  - 0.941
5The fourth data source is the U.N. annual sectoral output series for each reporting
country during the period 1960-1988.5 To create annual toxic intensity estimates for each
sample country, the Total Toxicity Intensity  measures  from Table 1 are applied to ISIC sector
shares. These national  intensity  estimates  form the basis for section  III's analysis of the sources
and probable environmental  consequences  of changing  sectoral composition.
2. The Assumption  of Constant Sectoral Intensities
As noted in the introduction, this paper does not attempt a comprehensive  analysis of
changes  in international  industrial  pollution. Constant,  U.S.-based, output  intensities  are adopted
because there is no choice --  international  data on within-sector  process mix and abatement
choices have not yet been collected. Nevertheless,  the following  estimates  will have first-order
validity if there is rough stability in the relative  pollution intensity of sectors across countries
and over time.  Such an assumption  of fixed  toxic intensity  embodies  at least three elements:
* The application  of observed US emission  intensities  to other countries  assumes
similar technologies  and enforcement  standards  across countries.  For instance,
to the extent that lower  income countries  lIave  more  pollution-intensive  techniques
for given industries  than  does the US (whether  because  of the state of know-how,
differing  regulations,  or greater difficulty  in enforcement),  the measures  generated
here understate  toxic outputs from lower income nations.  On the other hand, if
emissions per unit of output are roughly similar no matter where the product is
produced, then the measures  will provide a reasonable  approximation.
* Closely  related to the above is an issue arising from the level of disaggregation
available in  the  industrial data.  The application of  US intensities to  other
countries  assumes either that the pollution intensities  of various products within
an industry  group are not too dissimilar or that the mix of products within each
industry is essentially the same across countries.
* Emissions are  assumed to  relate to  an industry's output rather than,  for
instance, to value added.  This may not be an unreasonable  assumption; the
limited availability  of data on international  value added prevent any systematic
evaluation.
In fact most existing empirical work assumes rough constancy  in relative cross-sectoral
pollution intensity, invariably identifying the same sets of  "heavy polluters" (e.g.  metals,
cement, pulp  and paper, chemicals) and  "light polluters" (e.g.  most light assembly, food
5. Some  of these data are published  in the United  Nations  Industrial  Statistics  Yearbook. These
data are deflated using the GDP deflator for each country, since specific deflators for each
manufacturing  sector are generally unavailable.
6products, instruments).  This assumption is largely based on  two sources: (a) case-oriented
engineering estimates of  intensities in  the few air  and water pollutants which have been
conventionally regulated in  the OECD economies since 1975; and (b) reported annual total
output- or investment-based  intensities  of expenditure  on pollution abatement  and control.  In
an appendix to  this paper  some partial evidence is reviewed on  the plausibility of  rough
constancy  in sectoral  intensities, which suggests  that this assumption  may  not be too misleading,
at least as a first approximation. Thus the following  analysis retains the assumption of fixed
toxic intensity that is common  to almost all prior work.
m,  Toxic Intensity of Industrial  Production:  Economic  Development.  Time Trends and
Trade Policies
In this section some proximate  determinants  of variations  in industrial toxic intensity  are
explored.  The results are presented in two parts: first, the pattern with respect to income per
capita and through time, and second, the role of trade policy.
1. Levels of Development  and Time Trends
The visual evidence in Figures l.A6 and 1.B brings out two important  points:
- Across countries, an inverse U relationship  does indeed  bold between GDP per
capita and total estimated toxic releases from manufacturing  relative to GDP.
This  is  shown in  Figure  L.A (and  is  confirmed in  unreported regression
analysis).'  This does not, of course, necessarily  imply that every country must
follow a pattern of rising toxic intensity  of production as development  proceeds,
followed  by declining  intensity  at more advanced  stages of development:  the time
path for individual  countries need not follow the cross country  pattern.  It should
also be emphasized that this pattern does not necessarily imply a decline in
aggregate toxic releases at higher levels of GDP, only that toxic releases per unit
of production fall among higher income countries.
* However, Figure  1.B exhibits no  tendency for intensity of  manufacturing
toxicity  per unit of manufacturing  output to decline  among  high income  countries.
Thus, the declining  portion in the inverse U relationship  just noted is a result of
6. The measure on the vertical axis in Figure 1.A is pounds of toxic emissions per 1000 US
1987$  of GDP in each country.
7. See the earlier study by Lucas, "Toxic  Releases  by Manufacturing:  World Patterns  and Trade
Policies," also prepared as a Background  Paper for the World Development  Report 1992 and
available in the Policy Research  Working Paper Series.
7the declining fraction  of GDP accounted  for by industrial  output, and not of any
shift toward a less toxic mix of industries  within manufacturing.
We have  also conducted  a more  detailed regression  analysis  for pooled  cross-section  time-
series data, based on the following  equation:
In Ni, = ao +  (b, + b2Y,J)t  +  (b 3 + b4Yj)Yj,
where N 1, = Toxic Intensity (country i, period t)
Yh = Real income per capita ($US  1987)
t = Time
This specification  allows for possible  variations  of trend intensity  growth (bl), both with income
(b2)  and over different periods: 1960-73;  1974-79;  and 1980-88. The latter permits one test of
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the possibility that stricter OECD environmental regulation in  the  mid-late 1970's had a
significant overall impact on the international  location of pollution-intensive  industries.  The
responsiveness of  toxic  intensity with respect  to  income (b3) is  also  permitted, in  this
specification,  to vary with income itself (b4).
Table 3 reports fixed-effects  estimates of this equation for the period 1960-1988,  with
one dummy variable included per country. When intensity is defined as industrial emissions
divided by GDP, the rise in intensity  with respect to rising income at least tapers off at higher
income levels.  On the  other hand, when intensity is  defined as  pollutants per  unit of
manufacturing  output, this is definitely  not the case (indeed, the relationship  in equation (2) goes
the other way).
To summarize, these results imply:
* that there is no transition to lower toxic intensity in manufacturing  at high incomes.
The toxic intensity of GDP declines only because the manufacturing  share in  GDP
declines  beyond a certain level of income.
* that growth in toxic intensity has been far more rapid in developing  countries.
9Table 3  Pooled Annual Data Across Countries: Fixed Effects Regressions
Dependent Variables: Logarithm (Toxic  Emissions/ Manufacturing Output or
GDP)
Toxic Emissions  Relative To:
Manufacturina Output  GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Time trend  9.206  9.901  27.396
(12.15)  (12.21)  (17.94)
Trend:  1960-73  4.598  17.895
(3.04)  (6.03)
1974-79  4.629  17.982
(3.07)  (6.08)
1980-88  4.637  17.973
(3.09)  (6.10)
Income per capita  0.886  0.666  0.870  2.483  2.310
(4.06)  (2.82)  (3.99)  (5.76)  (5.38)
Income squared  0.001  -0.001  -0.001
(2.39)  (2.66)  (2.50)
Income * Trend  -0.450  40.350  -0.442  -1.260  -1.173
(4.11)  (2.98)  (4.03)  (5.89)  (5.51)
No. country dummies  80  80  80  73  73
No. observations  1517  1517  1517  1395  1395
R squared  0.79  0.79  0.80  0.93  0.93
T-statistics in parentheses.
2. Trade Liberalifation and Toxic Intensity  of Manufacturing
In order to explore the consequences  of altemative trade regimes for the local toxic
intensity of manufacturing  production, we have adopted a price level distortion index recently
10developed  by David Dollar (1990) for the period 1973-1985.' For present purposes, Dollar's
sample of 95 developing  countries  is divided into seven rank groups: rank 1 LDCs exhibit the
least distortion  from international  price norms; rank 7, the highest. The OECD economies  are
not included  in Dollar's sample. Two approaches  are therefore  adopted for the OECD  countries:
(a) assigning a Dollar rank of 0 to these cases, and; (b) omitting  the OECD  countries from the
sample.
The average  annual rate of growth in total toxic intensity  relative  to manufacturing  output
within each country is regressed upon Dollar's index of trade openness. 9 More precisely,
country growth rates in toxic intensity  are regressed upon the growth rate :n per capita iricome
within countries over the relevant time interval, the logarithm  of the per capita income at the
beginning  of each interval, and the Dollar index interacted  with the growth in per capita  income.
The estimated  equations  also incorporate  a measure  of the share of export earnings  derived  from
fuel exports (in an attempt to capture any impact of related toxic-intensive  sectors), but in the
balance this has no apparent effect.
One interpretation  of any differences  between  the three decades  is as follows:  the 1960's
provide  a pre-environmentalist  control, while  the 1970's  and 1980's may  provide  evidence  about
short- and long-run adjustments  in the wake of stricter OECD  regulation. Table 4 presents  the
estimated results for the three decades.
For the 1960's, when almost no environmental  regulations  had yet been imposed by the
various countries, the regression has no explanatory  power; from these data we are unable to
detect any significant  general trend in toxic intensity change.  There is no impact for either
initial income or income growth during the 1960s.
In the 1970's and 80's, however, the situation  changes  sharply. The implications  of the
results for these two decades are perhaps most readily seen from the tableau marked as Table
5.
8. Briefly, Dollar's index uses the Summers  and Heston price index for a constant basket of
commodities  across countries. Under free trade, such a basket of tradeable  goods ought to have
the same price everywhere. Departures from unity may then be interpreted  as a consequence  of
some form of trade barrier. In practice some nontradeables  enter the basket of commodities.
Dollar attempts to control for this latter difficulty  by regressing the raw index on measures  of
factor endowments  (presumed to affect relative prices of nontradeables  across countries). The
residual from these regressions  is then adopted to form the purged index.
9.  The annual growth rates are first estimated by fitting a regression of intensity upon time
within each of three time intervals: 1960-69; 1970-79; 1980-88. The trend growth rate is
estimated this way only for countries  with at least five observations  available within each time
period, so the sample size varies slightly from decade to decade.
11Table 4  Inpact  of Income Growth. Level of Development. Openness to Trade and Fuel
Status on the Growth Rate of Toxic Intensity, by decade
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate in Toxic Emissions/ Manufacturing  Output
Includino  OECD  Countries  Exciuding  OECD  Countries
60's  70's  80's  60's  70's  8B's
Intercept  -0.071  0.053  -0.030  0.03  0.094  -0.067
(0.78)  (2.39)  (1.19)  (0.19)  (2.39)  (1.60)
Growth  in  per  capita  0.096  -0.596  -1.71  -0.008  -0.696  -1.96
income  (0.19)  (1.63)  (2.72)  (0.30)  (1.57)  (2.1)
Ln (initial  per  0.008  -0.005  0.006  0.001  -0.012  0.012
capita  income)  (0.60)  (1.80)  (1.65)  (0.01)  (2.0)  (1.9)
Fuel  share  in exports  -0.046  -0.021  -0.003  -0.010  -0.031  -0.016
(0.32)  (0.834)  (0.14)  (0.06)  (1.09)  (0.51)
Dollar's  index  0.223  0.589  0.297  0.664
Interacted  with  (1.92)  (3.10)  (2.10)  (2.37)
income  growth
No. observations  25  56  55  19  44  39
R squared  0.03  0.18  0.19  .01  0.22  0.22
T-statistics  in  parentheses
This tableau has three dimensions:




Two annual growth rates are shown:
Slow (1  %)
Fast (6%)
And two level's of Dollar's index are depicted:
Open (1)
Closed (6)





Income  Growth  70s  80s  70s  SOS
Slow  2.4  -1.2  3.5  1.8
Fast  .6  -6.7  7.2  10.9




Income  Growth  70s  80s  70s  80s
Slow  1.2  .4  2.3  3.3
Fast  -. 1  -5.2  6.0  12.4
HIGH  INCOME COUNTRIES
Per  Capita
Income  Growth  70s  80s
Slow  -.1  1.9
Fast  -1.9  -3.7
The fundamental  importance  of policy emerges strikingly  in these results. Fast-growing
closed economies  experienced very rapid change toward toxic intensive structures in both the
1970s and  1980s, with acceleration in  the latter decade for both low- and middle-income
developing  countries.  In contrast, fast-growing  open economies  experienced  essentially  toxic-
neutral structural change  in the 1970s  and a strong shift toward less-toxic  structure  in the 1980s.
The same trends are evident in slower-growing  economies,  but less pronounced. This evidence
leads us to a strong qualification  of our earlier conclusions:
While developing countries as a whole had greater toxic intensity growth in
the 1970s  and 1980s, trends for individual countries depended heavily on the
growth  rate  of  income  and  the  policy  regime.  The  story  of  "toxic
displacement" seems to have been focused in relatively closed, fast-growing
economies.
IV.  Summary and Conclusions
Several previous studies have asked whether environmental controls imposed in the
industrialized  economies  are diverting investments  in pollution intensive activities off-shore.10
10. Dean (1991) offers a very useful survey of this material.
13In broad terms these studies reach a negative  conclusion:  direct investment  does not appear to
be stimulated  by such regulations, in part because the cost of emission controls is generally a
tiny fraction of operating  costs.  Yet direct investment  reflects only a portion of what may be
happening  to world production patterns; technology  transfers may occur with no simultaneous
direct investment,  and production  may readily  shift toward  a different  global distribution  without
either direct investment  or technology  transfer.
In this paper, a very general test of the displacement  hypothesis  has been  attempted.  Time
series estimates of  manufacturing  pollution intensity for a large sample of  developed and
developing countries during the period 1960-1988  have been developed.  The results derived
from these data may be summarized  in terms of the three lines of analysis set out in section  1.4.
* Development and sectoral composition:
(a) As a result of industrial composition shifts, total manufacturing  emissions
relative to GDP grow faster than GDP at lower levels of income  per capita, then,
at higher levels of income, grow less quickly.  In other words, an inverse U-
shape is confirmed  between industrial pollution  intensity  and income.
(b) The decline observed in total industrial emissions  rela:ive to GDP at higher
income levels, is a result of the declining  share of manuf;  -"!ring in GDP, rather
than of any shift toward a cleaner mix of manufacturing  activities.  The pooled
cross-country time series estimates reveal no tendency for toxic intensity of
manufacturing  itself to exhibit an inverse U-shape.  On the other hand, the data
do indicate that the more rapidly growing high income countries have actually
enjoyed  a negative  growth in toxic intensity  of their manufacturing  mix. To what
extent the latter result is a  reflection of  more rapid introduction of cleaner
technologies  in more rapidly growing economies  cannot be discerned, but it is
certainly a potential explanation.
9 OECD environmental regulation and displacement:
It is frequently  asserted that stricter regulation  of pollution-intensive  production
in  the  OECD countries has led  to  significant locational displacement, with
consequent  acceleration  of industrial pollution  intensity in developing  countries.
All our results are consistent  with this hypothesis.  Both sets of estimates  suggest
that the poorest economies  have  the highest  toxic intensity  growth. The estimated
toxic intensity  elasticity  of income  growth  for a typical  (midrange-distortion)  LDC
economy  was apparently  negligible  in the 1960's, positive  in the 1970's, and even
higher in the 1980's.  Of course, one cannot be certain of a causal connection
between these decadal patterns and the  roughly concurrent shifts in  OECD
environmental policies.  The results are  nonetheless suggestive of a  strong
contributory  effect.
14* LDC economic policy and pollution intensity:
Pollution intensity has grown most rapidly in developing economies that are
relatively closed to  world market forces.  Relatively closed, fast-growing
economies experienced very rapid structural transitions toward greater toxic
intensity.  The opposite seems to  have been true, however, for more open
economies.
More work on this issue clearly needs to be done, but the results in this paper
suggest that  net toxic displacement  toward  the LDCs may not have  been inevitable
during the past two  decades. Restrictive  trade policies  imposed  by the developing
countries themselves  may even have been the main stimulus to toxic industrial
migration, rather than regulatory  cost differences  between the North and South.
It is hoped that these results will suggest future directions  for analysis; much remains to
be done. For instance,  although  the present  results suggest  that more liberal trade policies  among
the developing  countries have focused  manufacturing  production  on a cleaner mix of industries,
we still lack evidence of the effects  of freer trade policies  on the choice  of production  technique,
on waste disposal, on toxicity  of consumption  activities and environmental  harm from changes
in agriculture.  Moreover, this paper has focused  on the global distribution  of toxic emissions
rather than upon changes in the global aggregate.  It is  too early to  draw any sweeping
conclusions  about the connections  between  protectionist  trade policies  and environmental  effects,
but it is hoped that this paper has at least suggested  some  empirical  foundations  for the debate.
15APPENDIX
This appendix presents four types of evidence relating to the international  and intertemporal
constancy of toxic intensity  for different industries.
1. Constancy  Across  Measures  of Pollution  Intensity
The analysis in the text uses  the US Environmental  Protection  Agency's  Toxic Release  Inventory
(TRI)  data. Since these data are not available before 1987 (and then only for the U.S.),  no
international  or intertemporal  series is available  for cross checking. Useful  indirect  evidence  can
be obtained, however, by checking the intersectoral correlation between the TRI data and the
US data on Pollution  Abatement  and Control Expenditures  (PACE). Figure A. 1 is a scatter plot
of ranks for 19 2-digit industries  according to: (a) the percentage of new plant and equipment
expenditures  absorbed  by pollution  abatement  and control; (b) the linear  weighted  toxic  pollution
intensity  of the industry. In this graph there is a clear outlier -- SIC 27 (printing  and publishing)
-- which exhibits high emissions according to the TRI data but very low pollution abatement
expenditures. If this exception is excluded, then pollution intensity (whether total, linear or
exponentially  weighted) is quite highly correlated with pollution abatement  expenditures. (See
Table A.1).
Table  A.1  Rank Correlations: PACE Expenditure  IntensIty  (19881 and Measures  of Toxic Pollution Intensky (19 2-Dialt
SIC Sectors)
Printing  and PLblishing (SIC 27):
Toxic  Intensity  Excluded  Included
Unweighted  .72  .55
Linear Human  .76  .55
Exponential Human  .74  .64
Flaure  A.1  PACE Expenditure  Intensity  Rank (19861 vs.  Linear  Weiahted Toxic  Pollution  Intensity  Rank (1987) (19 2-
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162. Constancy  Across Countries  in the OECD
Figure A.2 plots the rank of 13 industries  in West Germany  during the mid-1970s  and the US
for 1975, according to pollution  abatement  expenditures  relative to new investments  in plant and
equipment. The raw data underlying this graph are presented in Table A.2. There is a clear
positive association  in sectoral  ranking  across the two countries,  and in fact the rank correlation
is 0.8. Comparable data for other countries (and especially for the LDCs) are not available.
However, this two country comparison  suggests that industries needing substantial  abatement
controls in  one country also require expensive controls in another, despite differences in
emphasis  on the various pollutants  and media  of release in the two countries.
Table  A.2  Percent  of New Plant  and Eaulpment Expendkturos  on Pollution Control. mid-1970's
West
U.S.  Germany*
Nonferrous metals  24.1  8.4
Paper  16.8  9.6
Stone,  cLay,  glass  14.3  --
Iron,  Steel  13.5  10.7
PetroLeun  11.8  19.9
Chemicals  10.9  11.1
Electric  power  9.7  --
Electrical  machinery  5.8  1.9
Lumber, furniture,  instruments,  misc.  5.3  2.4
Food, beverages  5.2  3.2
Textiles  4.6  1.5
R.ubber  4.0  1.9
Motor vehicles  3.9  2.0
Apparel,  leather,  tobacco, printing/publishing  2.8  1.5
Machinery, except  electrical  1.8  1.3
Fabricated  metals  --  .5
*West German  data  are  averages for  the  period  1971-77
Sources: Tietenberg  (1988),  drawn from various  US  Surveys of
Current  Business; OECD  (1985)
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3. Constancy  Over Time in the U.S.
In the U.S., sectoral Pollution Abatement  Control Expenditure  data have been collected since
the 1970's. Table A.3 presents  correlations  for PACE expenditure  intensities  (PACE divided  by
total shipment value) in 1974, 1980, and 1986."1  The correlations  are very high and show no
sign of decreasing  over time. We conclude  that, in the U.S. at least, sectoral "heavy polluters"
have retained their identity since 1970.
Table  A.3  Correlations:  Seetoral  PACE  Exoendkure  Intensities  (19 2-DiLt  SIC  Seotorsl
1974  1980
1980  .94
1986  .94  .94
4. Process and Abatement  Considerations
Economists generally assume that sectoral technology mix will be different in  developing
11. Our thanks to Hamid Alavi for generously making these data available  to us.
18countries, and that pollution  abatement  equipment  will not be installed  in the absence of formal
regulation. Empirical work on the technology  question from an environmental  perspective has
only recently  begun, and survey  evidence  on abatement  choices is practically  nonexistent.  A few
recent studies, however, raise some  doubts about the conventional  wisdom.
A twenty-five  year analysis of international  diffusion  for wood pulping technology  by Wheeler
and Martin (1991) finds that developing countries with open trade policies exhibit no lag in
adoption of the newest and cleanest technology. Huq and Wheeler (1991, forthcoming)  report
survey results for a small sample of pulp and fertilizer  plants in Bangladesh.  The combination
of public ownership and aid dependency  in this extremely  poor economy  has led to technology
adoption which is largely dictated by prevailing norms in donor countries. Although formal
regulation  is almost  entirely lacking, many large, polluting  Bangladeshi  enterprises have  already
instituted  monetary  compensation  and first-level  effluent  treatment  in response  to strong  pressure
from neighboring  communities.
There is at present no strongly  persuasive  evidence  about the environmentally  relevant  direction
of departures from typical OECD technology mix in developing  countries. Wheeler and Huq
(1991, forthcoming) find rapid adoption of the newest, least polluting (electric arc) steel
technology  in many developing  countries. This, coupled  with newcomer  avoidance  of the highly-
polluting  open hearth process, which remained  important  in many OECD countries during the
1970's, implies average pollution intensities which may be quite close to  typical OECD
intensities, even allowing for significant  differences in abatement. Thus Wheeler and Martin
(1992, forthcoming) find that slower average adoption of new clean pulping technology  by
developing  countries is almost exactly counterbalanced  by slower average decline  in the oldest
technology  (mechanical  pulping), which is also quite clean.
5. Conclusion
This evidence, although  admittedly  sparse, nonetheless  suggests  that an assumption  of constant
relative toxic intensities  within industries,  both across  countries  and though time, may not be too
egregious: the adopted measures  of toxic intensity  are highly correlated  with PACE expenditure
intensity; for the U.S. and West Germany  aggregate  sectoral PACE expenditure  intensities  are
highly correlated; within the U.S., PACE expenditure  intensities  have very high intertemporal
correlations;  and case study evidence suggests  a number  of reasons why LDC technologies  are
not necessarily more pollution intensive, as often presumed.
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